Assessing the Reality of the Deep Seabed
Regime
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In order to be effective, internationallaw must stand in some direct relation to state practice. The gap between legal prescription
and state practice must not be too large or the law will be ineffective. This article examines this gap relative to the deep seabed
provisions (PartXI) of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. If the gap is not narrowed, the treaty may never
enter into force.
INTRODUCTION

Virtually no area of international law commanded more attention
during the last decade than the law of the sea. Because the academic
community so occupied itself with the emerging new treaty signed on
December 10, 1982,1 an assessment of the aspirations of that treaty
in comparison with other successes and failures of international law
is important. Of essential note is the political context that created
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea2 (1982 Convention). The Convention was an end-product which recognized the
numerous shortcomings of post-World War II international law,
many of which stemmed from archaic conventional law that ignored
the aspirations of developing states and did little more than codify
existing customary law. Thus, the 1982 Convention was a new
stroke; an attempt to create modern treaty law sensitive to the needs
of the poor states and attuned to the state system of the 21st
century.
*
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1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, openedfor signature Dec.
10, 1982, U.N. Doc.A/CONF.62/122.
2. Id.
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International law can be profitably viewed as directly proportional
to state practice. International law prescribes certain standards of
conduct which states feel obligated to follow. Law may chart new
directions, though practice lags behind. When the gap between law
and practice is reasonably small, law may mold practice, thereby
striking congruence with the legal prescription. Arguably, this is the
way custom usually develops. On the other hand, law may play no
useful role whatsoever when it is out of line with state practice. In
fact, it may do a disservice by creating the illusion of compliance
where none exists. This article will examine the deep seabed provisions of the 1982 Convention with a view to assessing the extent of
this gap between treaty-law prescription and state practice. In particular, this article will examine the portion of the treaty dealing
with "The Area" beyond national jurisdiction,3 where an International SeaBed Authority is established with control over the exploration and exploitation of seabed resources.4
THE PRESCRIBED LAW

The provisions of the 1982 Convention dealing with "The Area"
are among the most complex in the entire treaty. The actual provisions of Part XI are best understood in light of the legal/political
context in which they were produced. The first two United Nations
Conferences on the Law of the Sea of 1958 and 1960 seem to have
paid no attention to the resources of the deep sea-bed, although it is
arguable that these resources were included in the regime of the high
seas." Yet more important than the actual provisions contained in
the four 1958 Conventions, 7 is the fact that these Conventions were
produced in one of the last full-scale diplomatic conferences dominated by views of a small group of developed states. By contrast, the
working context of the 1982 Conference (UNCLOS III) reflected
the perceptions of developing countries that old international law
was antique, and favored the rich and powerful. The United Nations
Moratorium Resolution of 1969 is one of the most concise and powerful statements evidencing the strong sentiment calling for a new
international economic order. 8 Although this Resolution suffers from
3. Id. at p. XI.
4. Id.
5. For an excellent description of these Conferences, see M. McDOUGAL & W.
BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).

6. Convention of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T., 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
7. The other three 1958 Conventions are: Convention on the Continental Shelf,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 14 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559
U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done Apr.
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
8. G.A. Res., 2574D, 24 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 38), U.N. Doc.A/7630, at 11
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all the limitations of U.N. resolutions which generally are thought to
lack the weight of law,9 the impact of the statement is hard to overestimate. The 1958 Geneva Conventions were in force at this time;
yet, in one motion, this Resolution restricted all law applicable to the
seabed area to a very narrow realm. That realm was to be the international regime created by a new treaty, the negotiating of which
had hardly begun.
When UNCLOS III convened, the mandate given the First Com-

mittee, "[t]o prepare draft treaty articles embodying the international regime -

including an international machinery -

for the

Area and the resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor,"'" operationalized the Moratorium Resolution. Thus, the bounds of law were
somewhat tightly drawn before the Conference commenced. Specifically, the ideological balance shifted so that an international regime
became the central focus.
Part XI of the 1982 Convention was intended to advance certain

general principles of international law. Ambassador Jens Evensen of
Norway, one of the leading figures in the negotiations, identified
three major principles from which specific provisions derived. These
principles included: the common heritage of mankind; that there

shall be no expropriation or claim or exercise of sovereign rights; and
that no entity could claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to

this area incompatible with the international regime to be
established."

Another, more specific, typology was suggested by Ambassador
Paul Engo of Cameroon, the chairman of the First Committee at

UNCLOS III. Engo found five key issues illustrating the nature of
the obligation created by the treaty. First, UNCLOS III needed to

determine which states were assured access to the seabed minerals.,2

(1969), adopted Dec. 15, 1969 by a vote of 62 in favor, 28 against and 28 abstentions.
The most important portions of the Resolution are:
[T]he exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed and the ocean floor... beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole....
. . .pending the establishment of the aforementioned international regime:
(a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all activities of exploitation of the resources of the area....
(b) No claim to any part of that area or its resources shall be recognized.
9. See Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States
and the N.LE.O., 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309, 314 (1975-76).
10. U.N. Doc.A/AC/138/SR.45 (1981).
11. Evensen, Keynote Address, in THE 1982 CONVENTION OF THE LAW
OF THE SEA xxv (1984).
12. Engo, Issues of First Committee at UNCLOS III in THE 1982 CON-

Second, UNCLOS III had to circumscribe the strength of the regime. 13 Third, a system of exploitation needed to be selected. 14 The
fourth issue mandating consideration was transfer of technology.1 5
Finally, according to Engo, the nature of decision-making within the
organs of the Authority had to be decided."" As discussed below, certain law is prescribed in each of these five areas under UNCLOS
III.
Access

The issue of access is complex, as it means different things to different groups of states. For developing states, the term connotes ac-

cess to the benefits from seabed mining. 17 Such access means the
right to exploit the resources with a minimum of interference. The
terms of access are spelled out in article 137.18
The provisions are very direct and clear. In essence, access to the

seabed will occur only under the terms of this Convention. Consequently, access for states must be "bought" by adhering to a number

of stipulations, most of which are subsumed under the other issues
herein discussed.
Strong Regime

Predictably, UNCLOS III created a strong regime; nothiig else
would have been acceptable given the political milieu. Engo notes

that the hallmark of a strong regime is "a monopoly in the exploitation of its resources."' 19 The exploitation system is, in large measure,
what made the regime strong. Yet certain attributes of regime

strength are not directly related to this system. For example, activiVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

13.
14.

15.

Id.

33, 39 (1984).

Id. at 41.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 45.

16. Id. at 46.
17. Id. at 39.
18. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 137.
I. No state shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any state or natural or juridical persons
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation. The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in
accordance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the
Authority.
3. No state or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights
with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with
this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights shall
be recognized.
19.

Engo, supra note 12, at 41.
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ties in the Area must: "be carried out in such a manner as to foster
healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of
international trade, and to promote international cooperation for the
overall development of all countries, especially developing states.1 20
Article 151 specifies production policies. For example, parties are
to cooperate "to promote the growth, efficiency and stability of markets for those commodities produced. . . [from] the Area. 21 An
elaborate set of production controls, however, is set up later in the
article.2 2 These production stipulations appear reasonable, yet note
that they are extremely rigid and leave little room for maneuvering.
These are only two examples of one of the most elaborate systems
ever envisioned for controlling the use of a natural resource. The ab20. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 150.
21. Id. at art. 151.
22. Id. The production controls include the following:
2. (a) During the interim period specified in paragraph 3, commercial production shall not be undertaken pursuant to an approved plan of work until the
operator has applied for and has been issued a production authorization by the
Authority. Such production authorizations may not be applied for and issued
more than five years prior to the planned commencement of commercial production under the plan of work unless, having regard to the nature and timing of
project development, the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority prescribe another period.
(b) In the application for the production authorization, the operator shall specify the annual quantity of nickel expected to be recovered under the approved
plan of work. The application shall include a schedule of expenditures to be
made by the operator after he has received the authorization which are reasonably calculated to allow him to begin commercial production on the date planned.
(d) The Authority shall issue a production authorization for the level of production applied for unless the sum of that level and the levels already authorized
exceeds the nickel production ceiling, as calculated pursuant to paragraph 4 in
the year of issuance of the authorization, during any year of planned production
falling within the interim period.
4. (a) The production ceiling for any year of the interim period shall be the sum
of:
(i) the difference between the trend line values for nickel consumption, as calculated pursuant to subparagraph (b), for the year immediately prior to the year
of the earliest commercial production and the year immediately prior to the
commencement of the interim period; and
(ii) sixty percent of the difference between the trend line values for nickel consumption, as calculated pursuant to subparagraph (b), for the year for which
the production authorization is being applied for the year immediately prior to
the year of the earliest commercial production.
7. The levels of production of other metals such as copper, cobalt and manganese extracted from the polymetallic nodules that are recovered pursuant to a
production authorization should not be higher than those which would have been
produced had the operator produced the maximum level of nickel from those
nodules pursuant to this article. The Authority shall establish rules, regulations
and procedures pursuant to Annex III, article 17, to implement this paragraph.

solute discretionary power retained by the Authority is one further
provision ensuring a strong regime.
System of Exploitation
Ambassador Engo's third issue, involving the system of exploitation, is covered in article 153. The hallmark.of this provision is the
so-called "parallel system," with activities carried out both by the
Enterprise and "in association with the Authority by States Parties,
or state enterprises . . . which meet the requirements provided in
this Part .
. "2

The detail and specificity required to develop a plan of work is
astounding - in fact a sizeable portion of Annex III deals with
these plans.24 The work plan requirements are totally unrealistic for
an emerging, developing, and uncertain industry. In addition, the
Authority can exercise any control it deems necessary over activities
in the Area conditioned only on "securing compliance with the relevant provisions of this Part and the Annexes. 25
Transfer of Technology
The transfer of technology is an important issue in any discussion
of the New International Economic Order. Part XI indicates that
the transfer of technology occurs on two levels. First, it enables the
Enterprise to exploit seabed resources itself. Second, the transfer of
technology is thought to be an effective way to redress the economic
imbalance in the world. The intent of the provisions is clear, but
specific applicability appears open-ended.
Article 144, which addresses the transfer of technology, embodies
two ideas. 26 These provisions are potentially very far reaching; they
23. Id. at art. 153-2(b).
24. Id. at 3, 4. A portion of article 153 gives a flavor of the requirements:
3. Activities in the Area shall be carried out in accordance with a formal written
plan of work drawn up in accordance with Annex III and approved by the
Council after review by the Legal and Technical Commission. In the case of
activities in the Area carried out as authorized by the Authority by the entities
specified in paragraph 2(b), the plan of work shall, in accordance with Annex
III, article 3, be in the form of a contract. Such contracts may provide for joint
arrangements in accordance with Annex III, article 11.
4. The Authority shall exercise such control over activities in the Area as is
necessary for the purpose of securing compliance with the relevant provisions of
this Part and the Annexes relating thereto, and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority, and the plans of work approved in accordance with paragraph 3. States Parties shall assist the Authority by taking all measures necessary to ensure such compliance in accordance with article 139.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. at art. 144:
1. The Authority shall take measures in accordance with this Convention:
(a) to acquire technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the
Area; and
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are more than quid pro quo deriving from a state's exploitation of
the seabed. A state party to the 1982 Convention with no aspirations
to mine the seabed might still incur an obligation to transfer technology to the Enterprise and to other parties.
Another form of technology transfer is detailed in Annex III, article 5. In essence this requires that every operator, upon request of
the Enterprise, make available "the technology which he uses in carrying out activities in the Area under the contract. 21 7 Far more details are contained in Annex III; many of these attempt to provide
fair payment for the technology transferred.2 Yet it remains evident
that such provisions would cause industry representatives to cringe.
They would respond that such technology is invaluable. If in the pro-

cess they exaggerate the cost, then the Enterprise could evoke compulsory settlement of the dispute in accordance with Part XI.29
Decisionmaking

Decisionmaking within the various organs of the Authority is typical of a large international organization. Article 156 establishes the
International SeaBed Authority with all state parties as members of

the Authority."0 The Authority is composed of four organs: an Assembly, a Council, a Secretariat, and the Enterprise. 3' The Assembly
32
consists of all members of the Authority, each having one vote.
Much of the de facto power of the Authority rests with the 36-mem(b) to promote and encourage the transfer to developing States of such technology and scientific knowledge so that all States Parties benefit therefrom.
2. To this end the Authority and States Parties shall co-operate in promoting
the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge relating to activities in the
Area so that the Enterprise and all States Parties may benefit therefrom. In
particular they shall initiate and promote:
(a) programs for the transfer of technology to the Enterprise and to developing
States with regard to activities in the area, including inter alia, facilitating the
access of the Enterprise and the developing States to relevant technology, under
fair and reasonable terms and conditions;
(b) measures directed towards the advancement of the technology of the Enterprise and the domestic technology of developing States, particularly by providing opportunities to personnel from the Enterprise and from developing States
for training in marine science and technology and for their full participation in
activities in the Area.
27. Id. at Annex III, art. 5-3(a).
28. Id. at art. 5-3(a),(b),(d).
29. Id. at art. 186-91.
30. Id. at art. 156.
31. Id. at art. 158.
32. Id. at art. 159.

ber Council. 33
Though unlikely, it is possible that some of the most important
mining states would be excluded from a seat on the Council, the
executive organ of the Authority. If certain states were hesitant to
become parties to the 1982 Convention,
such provisions may have
34
convinced them not to participate.
The procedure for a review Conference after fifteen years is also
provided for by the 1982 Convention.3 5 Most of this seems reasonable, since it follows the consensus approach of UNCLOS III itself. If
agreement is not possible, however, the system of exploration and
exploitation may be modified.36 This provision creates the real, and
perhaps extraordinarily disquieting prospect, that original parties
who do not agree to changes accepted by three-fourths of the parties
may be bound by these changes against their will.

33. Id. at art. 161. Article 161 details the required composition of the Council:
1. The Council shall consist of 36 members of the Authority elected by the
Assembly in the following order:
(a) four members from among those States Parties which, during the last five
years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than 2 percent of total world consumption or have had net imports of more than 2 percent
of total world imports of the commodities produced from the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, and in any case one State from the Eastern
European (Socialist) region, as well as the largest consumer;
(b) four members from among the eight States Parties which have the largest
investments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area, either directly or through their nationals, including at least one State from the
Eastern European (Socialist) region;
(c) four members from among States Parties which on the basis of production in
areas under their jurisdiction are major net exporters of the categories of minerals to be derived from the Area, including at least two developing States whose
exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their economies;
(d) six members from among developing States Parties, representing special interests. The special interests to be represented shall include those of States with
large populations, States which are land-locked or geographically disadvantaged,
States which are major importers of the categories of minerals to be derived
from the Area, States which are potential producers of such minerals, and least
developed States;
(e) eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring an equitable
geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided that each
geographical region shall have at least one member elected under this subparagraph. For this purpose, the geographical regions shall be Africa, Asia, Eastern
European (Socialist), Latin America and Western European and Others.
34. J. Breaux, The Case Against the Convention, in THE 1982 CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 10, 12 (1984).
35. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 155.
36. Id. If five years after its commencement, the Review Conference has not
reached agreement on the system of exploration and exploitation of the resources of the
Area, it may decide during the ensuing 12 months, by a three-fourths majority of the
States Parties, to adopt and submit to the States Parties for ratification or accession such
amendments changing or modifying the system as it determines necessary and appropriate. Such amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 12 months after the
deposit of instruments of ratification or accession by three-fourths of the States Parties.
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REACTIONS TO THE PRESCRIPTIONS

The situation with respect to seabed mining is different from that
usually encountered by international law, since no actual state behavior exists to which the legal prescription can be compared. No
commercial mining is underway. Numerous projections have been
made,3 7 but the combination of falling prices for the minerals and
the uncertainty of the international legal situation makes commercial
mining unlikely before the next century.
Two approaches are possible to assess the gap between prescription and reality. First, one may consider states' official pronouncements about the new treaty. This gives some idea of behavior, if and
when mining occurs. Second, one can examine the firmer index of
signature and ratification of the 1982 Convention.
The position of the United States regarding the new treaty is wellknown. After participating in the negotiations for more than a decade, the United States announced that it would not sign the 1982
Convention. 8 In fact, the United States declined to participate in
the Preparatory Commission as an observer, although entitled to as a
signatory of the Final Act. 9 Further, while approximately thirty additional states remain eligible to sign the treaty, only the United
States, Argentina and Turkey have conspicuously stated that they
would not sign.40
The position of the Reagan administration has been put forth in
many official documents. Recently, Congressman Breaux of Louisiana succinctly explained the position of the United States:
The President has stated, and many members of Congress have agreed, that
in the area of deep sea mining the [1982] Convention is flawed because
there is no assured access to the mineral wealth of the oceans. The security
of tenure of contracts is lacking; and technology transfer requirements are
unfair and impractical ....

I submit that when we are considering this

treaty we are not just dealing with the law of the sea; there are implications
for future treaties and for future discussions on technology transfer. 41

Breaux went on to enumerate some of the other concerns of the
37. M. SHYAM, 1 METALS FROM THE SEABED (1982). Shyam projected that there
would be several large-scale, commercial mining operations before 1990.
38. For a discussion of the position of the United States, see Gamble & Frankow-

ska, The Significance of Signature to the 1982 Montego Bay Convention on the Law of
the Sea, 14 OCEAN DEV. AND INT'L L.J. 121 (1984).

39. Id. at 138-42.
40. R. Platzoeder, Who will Ratify the Convention, in THE 1982
THE LAW OF THE SEA

41.

662, 663 (1984).

J. Breaux, supra note 34, at 12.

CONVENTION ON

United States, including voting in the Council, 42 contract45approval, 43
production limitations, 4 and the amendment procedure.
The position stated by Congressman Breaux represents the antiConvention extreme. Ambassador Elliot Richardson, who fought a
gallant losing battle in support of United States participation, believes that the Breaux position is counterproductive:
If indeed deep sea-bed mining were a high-seas freedom equivalent to
catching tuna, anyone else who came along would be free to engage in the
exploitation of that same area of the deep sea-bed - even perhaps deciding
to follow your mining vessel in the same track ....

The result is that, in

order to achieve the security that will justify investing $1.5 billion in a single deep sea-bed mining site, and in order to have the opportunity to recover that investment over a period of twenty years, the miner must have
the consent of substantially
all countries. Universality thus becomes neces4
sary to the investor.

Support for the United States' position is mixed among the developed states of Western Europe. UNCLOS III, in general, and Part
XI, in particular, have long been a cause c~lhbre for developing
states. They maintain the new treaty provisions are the law on the
subject and must be followed to the letter. Statements may be cited
from most Third World Governments asserting their belief in the
absolute applicability of Part XI. Typical of these positions is the
statement by S.M. Thompson Flores of Brazil:
Universal recognition of the principle of the common heritage of mankind is
one of those events that few generations have the privilege of witnessing.
The birth of a principle of international law assumes that for a specific
objective nations agree to put aside their individual powers and channel
47
their own interests through the path of the common interests of all.

One can sense the apprehension in this statement - universality is
the goal, but Thompson Flores realizes it has yet to be achieved.
Many seem to be trying to will the new regime into existence. In a
sense, Thompson Flores believes the hard work put into the 1982
Convention over so many years and widespread agreement should
give birth to a legal principle. Tommy T. B. Koh, the president of
the 1982 Conference, succinctly expressed this line of reasoning,
stating that "[in]any are of the view that article 137 (seabed mining
provisions) of the Convention has become as much a ' part
of custom48
ary international law as the freedom of navigation.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
E. Richardson, The Case for the Convention, in THE 1982 CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA 4, 6-7 (1984).

47. U.N. Doc.A/CONF.62/PV.187, at 12 (1983) (statement by S.M. Thompson
Flores).
48. U.N. Dept. of Public Information, Press Release, SEA/MB/14, at 2 (Dec. 10,
1982), T. Koh.
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TABLE I
SIGNATURES AND RATIFICATIONS TO THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
(Lower Case - Signature Only, UPPER CASE - Signature and Ratification)
Afganistan
Algeria
Angola
Ant. & Bar.
Argentina

*Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dona. Rep.
EGYPT

Kuwait
Lao PE. D. Rep.
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar

St. Vin. & Gren.
Samoa
Sao. Tome & Prin.
SENEGAL
Seychelles

Australia
Austria
BAHAMAS
Bahrain
Bangladesh

Equa. Guinea
Ethiopia
FIJI
Finland
*France

Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Mauritania

Sierra Leone
Singapore
Solomon Is.
Somalia
Sri Lanka

Mauritius
MEXICO

Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland

Barbados
BELIZE
Benin
Bhutan
Brazil

Gabon
GAMBIA
Germany (GDR)
GHANA
Greece

Bulgaria
Burma
Burundi
Byeorussia
Cameroon

Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana

*Canada
Cape Verde
Cen. Afr. Rep.
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
CUBA
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Dem. Kampuchea
Dem. Yemen

Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
NAMIBIA
Nauru
Nepal
*Netherlands

Syr. Arab Rep.
Thailand
Togo
Trin. & Tob.
Tunisia

Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
Iceland
India

New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Oman

Tuvalu
Uganda
Ukr. SSR
USSR
Utd. Arab Ems.

Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
IVORY COAST

Pakistan
Panama
Papua N. Gui.
Paraguay
PHILIPPINES

Upper Volta
Uruguay
Vanuatu
Viet Nam
Yemen

Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
Saint Lucia

Yugoslavia
Zaire
ZAMBIA
Zimbabwe

JAMAICA
*Japan
Kenya
Korea (DROK)
Korea (ROK)

*Strong interest in seabed mining.

Thus the battle lines are clearly drawfi. The vast majority of states
in the world support Part XI as the only auspices and rules under
which deep seabed mining may occur. Conversely, the Reagan administration opposes the treaty, maintaining that there is not universal agreement about Part XI. Under the Reagan view, states have
the right to undertake deep seabed operations outside the treaty
framework. These dichotomous viewpoints indicate that an assessment of the realities of the gap must be examined via the more concrete manifestations of support for the 1982 Convention, such as signatures and ratifications.4"
49.

Up-to-date information provided by the Treaty Division of the U.N. Secreta-

This is a propitious time to look at signature; the deadline for signatures (two years after the signing ceremony) is almost upon us. It
is reasonably safe to assume that in the process of considering
whether or not to sign the Convention, most states have critically
examined it.
Table I shows signatures and ratifications as of November 12,
1984.50 The number of signatories is very impressive, and very high
by historical standards. The treaty now has 139 signatories, 22 since
the signing ceremony. An abundance of literature exists on the
meaning of signature to a convention. 51 The general attitude, briefly
summarized, is that states incur an obligation not to defeat the object and 5 purpose
of a Convention between signature and
2ratification.
In some ways, the most significant question regarding the 1982
Convention is which states have not signed the Convention. Although 139 signatures represent a preponderance of states in the
world, they may not include many of the states most likely to participate in seabed mining. Further, although the states in the world
might be able to raise the $1.5 billion needed for a full-scale mining
operation,5 3 very few are likely to use resources in this manner.
Renate Platzoeder, a member of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany and skilled observer of seabed politics, felt that
these few states have the keenest interest in mining:
Belgium
Canada
.Denmark

France
Germany (F.R.)

Italy
Japan
The Netherlands

The United Kingdom
U.S.A."

Certain other countries may get involved, e.g, Brazil, India and
Mexico, 5 at some later date. Only half of this "group of ten,"
namely, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan and the Netherlands,
have signed the 1982 Convention.
It is widely acknowledged that signature does not guarantee ratification. 56 In the case of th 1982 Convention, there have been only
fourteen ratifications, far short of the 60 required for its entry into
force. 57 This group contains none of the states most likely to be mariat, Nov. 13, 1984.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Gamble & Frankowska, supra note 38.
52. Id. at 123-29.
53. M. SHYAM, supra note 37.
54. R. Platzoeder, supra note 40, at 665-66.
55. For an excellent discussion, see Boczek, Ideology and the Law of the Sea: The
Challenge of the NIEO, 7 B.C. INT'L AND COMM. L. REV. 1 (1984).
56. See Gamble & Frankowska, supra note 38.
57. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at art. 308.
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jor players in seabed mining. This does not bode well for the 1982
Convention, nor, inferentially, for assertions that this new legal prescription is universal law binding on all states in the world. The slow
rate at which ratifications have been accumulating, coupled with
continued belief on the part of the developing states that the 1982
Convention is the only legal way to mine the seabed, clearly indicates a huge, perhaps unbridgeable, gulf between prescription and
reality.
CONCLUSION

The deep seabed regime exemplifies the significant gap between
legal prescription and probable state behavior. It represents a complicated situation, because in the view of most states the prescription
is already entrenched, even though the 1982 Convention may be
years away from entry into force and mining may not begin in this
century. The modal view of the developing states is understandable
and not unreasonable. They feel the treaty is the culmination of a
long negotiating process replete with scores of balances and compromises. These states believe the United States and others incurred
a moral obligation, if not a legal one, to accept the terms of the new
treaty. Statements of the United States, to the effect that a treaty
negotiation does not guarantee an acceptable end-product, seem
chauvinistic and petty to the developing states.""
Whether this gap between prescription and practice can be
bridged, or at least narrowed, depends principally on the United
States. The present position of the Reagan administration seems irreversible.5 9 The ocean industry remains firmly against the treaty.
Platzoeder holds out a glimmer of hope that the United States will
change its mind.6 0 She finds such a change unlikely, however, noting
that only "big powers and some odd states having no interest in the
use of the sea can afford to stay away from the [1982] Conven58.

Engo, supra note 13, at 47.

59. "The best of all worlds . . . ." Letter from Jeffrey Ansbaugh, President of
Ocean Ministry Associates, cited in K. Shusterich, 202 RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND
THE OCEANS (1983). Recently, Ambassador Engo captured some of the feelings and
frustration:
The U.S. seat on the train to the international cooperation of which Henry Kissinger spoke is empty. Standing near seats reserved for them are some of its
allies-demonstrating either hardened solidarity or seeking reasons to waiver.
For those who spent a critical part of their lives dedicated to the great ideal of
peace through universally recognized law in the ocean space, it is an occasion
for remorse, but, one hopes, not for discouragement.
60. R. Platzoeder, supra note 40, at 663.

tion."' e What might reverse the United States position? Perhaps Soviet Union ratification of the 1982 Convention would persuade the
United States to reconsider its stance. However, the Soviet Union's
main objectives from UNCLOS III, passage through international
straits and a 12-mile territorial sea, may be obtainable from customary law.62 Possibly the second Reagan administration will seek advice from different quarters which might result in a reconsideration
of its original decision. Ambassador Elliot Richardson, a Republican,
supports the treaty and makes numerous cogent points:
Frankly, I do not see how the United States or anyone else can ever undertake to engage in serious international negotiations unless it is prepared to
make basic compromises. As to my own observation in 1977 that the treaty
was flawed, I would like to remind you that I was referring to what was
then called the Informal Composite Negotiating Text, and that in the period July 1977 to the end of the August session of 1980, there were 138
changes made in the sea-bed mining provisions alone - all but seven of
which were in favor of the Western industrial countries.0 3

The gap is huge. It could expand and influence many other areas
beside the law of the sea. The only chance for improvement in this
difficult situation is some softening of the United States' position,
which seems unlikely in the immediate future. Of course, the treaty
may take years to enter into force, which would provide ample opportunity for many United States administrations to consider the situation. Before that can occur, however, momentum may be lost and
the treaty will be doomed.
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